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FORDHAm LAW REVIEW

ARE AUTOMOBILES INHERENTLY DANGEROUS TO
THE PURCHASER?
The question of the liability of manufacturers of chattels for
their negligence to persons not in privity of contract with them,
which has occupied the courts for years, has taken on a new importance with the common use of automobiles and the dangers
incident to the use of heavy vehicles travelling often at the speed
of an express train over the highways.
Motor vehicles go ordinarily from the manufacturer to the
dealer who buys outright, and from the dealer to the purchaser,
who may be skillful, careful and intelligent, or who may be
clumsy, careless and unteachable. They are distributed far and
wide in the hands of those who have no contractual relation with
the manufacturer.
.:-,I
Among the many thousand carsso_ placed on the market annually, all are not, perfect and without flaw,; and among those
defective in their. parts some will break andinjure, the occupants
and others. If the, maker of such a'car4,knowing of, a defect, conceals the fault for- the ,'purpose of making a 'better sale, the
authorities are agreed that he is liable to persons injured thereby.
Thus inKueiling v: Leani'183 N .Y.78, the land;roller,>ordinairily
an innocuous, farm implemhent, -was _put into: the marketc, with a
weak tongue due to.a :knot; hole concealed, by putty :and-; paint
which made, it dangerous. /,The -manufacturer, -in an action for
personal injuries, .was held liable for fraudulent concealrient.. ,
_1 -But the liability ofd.he manufacturer formerd negligence rests
on a different basis.rWe may start With two fundamental rules: ,
I. It is the, duty, of the vendor of an article which, although
properly -made,,is dangerous-in its nature, to life and limb, orlikely
to become so in .the course- of the ordinary- usage to be contemplated by the vendor, either-to exercise due-care to warn users of
the danger or to take redsonable careto pxevent the, article msold
from becoming dangerous, and -the manufacturer. is.liable for
injury due tobreach of this' duty to a third:person not a,party to
the contract.,for sale, -(Thomas rv. Winchester, (drugs dangerous
to.human life) 6 N. Y, 397; Devlin v. Smith, (sdaffold, ninety, feet
high) 89 N. Y. 470; Torgesen. v.,.Schultz, -(bottles, for aerated
water likely toexplode) 192 N. Y 156; Statler v. Ray, -(a:battery
of coffee urns in a public restaurant) ,195,N.,Y.-478.)
. ,j
2. With this exception, when the. defective article:has been
sold and delivered ,to.the original purchaser, the manufacturer, is
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not liable for injuries subsequently sustained by a third person
in consequence- of the manufacturer's negligence merely, where
there is no fraudulent concealment. (Huset v. Threshing Co. (a
threshing machine) 120 Fed. 865; Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co.
(poisonous dye in a fur coat) 177 Mich. 45; Loop v. Litchfield,
(balance wheel on a horse power circular saw) 42 N. Y. 351;
Losee v. Clute, (steam boiler) 51 N. Y. 494.)
The reason for the rule has been variously stated. Lord
Abinger in the leading English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109, (the mail coach case) says that "the most absurd
and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would
ensue" if tle rule were extended. Alderson, in the same case,
said: "The safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who
enter into the contract."
Professor Bohlen, in his recent valuable work on Torts, speaking of such things as cars or carriages; states the reason in terms
of logic rather than convenience, and says that "injury to third
persons is not the natural or probable effect of negligence in their
manufacture, because (1) such a result cannot ordinarily be reasonably anticipated and because (2) an independent cause,-the
responsible human agency of the purchaser . . . intervenes .
The substantial explanation of the limitation of liability seems
to be that if the thing properly made issafe for normal use, the
liability of the manufacturer for negligent construction must not
be extended so as to restrict and hamper trade and commerce and
make the manufacturer practically the nsurer of the safety of all
who come near the product of his skill and industry. The proposition is one of policy rather than of law or logic.
Unusual difficulties have attended the application of the rule
in the case of automobiles and the decisions are not harmonious.
The Appellate Division, 3rd Department, has allowed a recovery
against the manufacturer for injuries due to a defective wheel
negligently inspected, in MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Car Co. (160
App. Div. 55) and the Circuit Court Qf Appeals, 2d Circuit, has
denied liability on similar facts, Cadillac v. Johnson (221 Fed.
801.) In a dissenting opinion in the latter case, Coxe, J., states
the plaintiff's point with his customary clearness and accuracy.
He says: "If the law, as stated in the prevailing opinion, is sustained, the owner of an automobile, entirely free from fault, may
be injured for life by the collapse of a decayed wheel, occurring a
few months after its purchase, and be absolutely without redress. . . . If this be so it follows that an injury may be
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occasioned by the grossest negligence and no one be legally responsible. Such a situation would, it seems to me, be a reproach
to our jurisprudence." In the case of Olds Motor Co. v. Shaffer
(145 Ky. 616) it is reasoned that because an automobile is
dangerous unless it is safely and properly constructed, the rule
might properly be extended "to hold manufacturers of articles
intended for public use, and that are liable, if defectively constructed, to inflict harm, responsible to third parties." But to
square such a result with leading New York cases, it would seem
necessary to hold that an automobile is per se inherently dangerous to the purchaser and Justice Woodward has said in Quackenbush v. Ford (167 App. Div. 433), in substance that a modern
automobile, properly equipped with brakes and assembled in
harmony with the plans underlying the construction, is not inherently a dangerous machine, but it becomes inherently unsafe
and a menace to the. safety of the public if the manufacturer fails
to use proper materials and due. care in construction, and that the
manufacturer's duty to the public is to be careful.
The difference between mail coaches and automobiles is one
of degree, but on such differences the law often draws distinctions, e. g., in determining the criminal liability of a child, com-.
petency to contract etc.
The new rule or the novel application of the old rule suggests
as a basis of liability the following:
1. An automobile properly made is safe for normal use, but
2. By negligent construction, injuries to third parties, purchasing of dealers, or not in privity with the manufacturer, might
be reasonably expected, because
3. The defect renders the automobile imminently dangerous so
that injury to the party using it and others is a natural and probable consequence of its use, therefore
4. It is the duty to the public of manufacturers of automobiles
to be careful as to (a) construction and (b) inspection, and it follows
5. They are liable, independent of contractual relation, to
those injured by their negligence.
But it is impossible at this time to foresee the ultimate result.
The prevailing opinion in the Cadillac case supra is a strong presentation on precedent of the case against liability and the dissenting opinion presents forcibly the reasons for impqsing a more
drastic rule.
CUTHBER'T W. PouND.

Judge of the Court of Appeals, State of New York.

